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While States mainly pursue their individual interests, there is nothing extraordinary in 
their acting for the protection of general interests, even those belonging to the interna-
tional community.1 
I. Introduction 
While the protection of community interests in the content and structure of contem-
porary international law, 2 their means of enforcement, 3 and the related responsibility 
regime4 have been mapped extensively, their exact relevance in the identification and 
• I would like to thank Eyal Benvenisti and Georg Nolte for their invitation to contribute and their 
feedback, and Matthieu Loup and Gaelle Mieli for their research and editorial assistance. This chapter 
was originally written as a single chapter and then divided in two; it is recommended therefore to read it 
together with its previous and more general companion chapter. 
1 Giorgio Gaja, The Protection of General Interests in the International Community, 364 COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 31 (2011). 
2 See, e.g., Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1994); Gaja, supra note 
l; FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011); THE COMMON 
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 2014). . 
3 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005); Christian J. Tams, Individual States as Guardians of Community Interests, in FROM BILATERALISM 
TO COMMUNITY INTEREST, supra note 2, at 379; James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of 
International Law, 365 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 194 
(2013). 
4 See, e.g., James Crawford, Responsibility for Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An Appraisal 
of Article 48 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST, supra note 2, at 224; Christian J. Tams & 
Alessandra Asteriti, Erga Omnes, Jus Cogens and Their Impact on the Law of State Responsibility, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION-EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 163 (Malcolm D. Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013). 
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interpretation of international law5 has not been explored in detail and still needs to 
be assessed.6 
Curiously, the starting point in the debate is usually, and it is the case in the present 
volume as well, that international lawmaking by states is self-interested, on the one 
hand, and accordingly necessarily conflicts with community interests, on the other. 
This way of framing the issue is misleading for the reasons explained in the previous 
chapter. In short, such critiques underestimate, on the one hand, the collective nature of 
states and their interests, and too quickly assimilate them to individuals, but also ignore 
the potential contribution that the institutional design of states, especially democratic 
states, can have on the protection of domestic and international community interests. 
On the other hand, they neglect the widespread and persistent reasonable disagreement 
there is about what community interests actually amount to and the importance of 
democratic state consent in their identification in the absence of a central international 
lawmaker able to determine our community interests in a democratic way. 
The present chapter goes one step further and aims, first of all, at identifying the ways 
in which community interests are channeled into the identification and interpretation 
of international law and, second, at the same time, at assessing these developments 
normatively. Like Gaja in the opening quotation, it argues that there is nothing ex-
traordinary in states' ability to act for the protection of community interests. In short, 
instead oflooking at how the rules of the international system are bent to accommodate 
community interests, the chapter's argument is that existing treaty-interpretation and 
custom-identification rules are already such that they enable states to protect commu-
nity interests and should merely be put into practice more effectively and transparently. 
Of course, the issue of the relevance of community interests and their protection 
in international lawmaking is vast. As a matter of fact, its scope remains tantalizing 
5 But see Shabtai Rosenne, Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Codified Law of Treaties, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP c. JESSUP 202 (Wolfgang 
Friedmann, Louis Henkin & Oliver Lissitzyn eds., 1982); Fouad Zarbiev, L'interpretation teleologique des 
traites comme instrument de prise en compte et demise en balance des valeurs et interets environnementaux, 
in LA CIRCULATION DES CONCEPTS JURIDIQUES: LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LENVIRONNEMENT: ENTRE 
MONDIALISATION ET FRAGMENTATION (Helene Ruiz Fabri & Lorenzo Gradoni eds., 2009); Jan Klabbers, 
The Community Interest in the Law of Treaties: Ambivalent Conceptions, in FROM BILATERALISM TO 
COMMUNITY INTEREST, supra note 2, at 768; Kenneth Keith, Bilateralism and Community in Treaty 
Law and Practice-of Warriors, Workers, and (Hook-)Worms, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY 
INTEREST, supra note 2, at 754. 
6 There is no mention of "community interests" as such in the ILC Reports on the identification and 
formation of customary international law (Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Formation 
and Evidence of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May 17, 2013); Michael Wood 
(Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A!CN.41 
672 (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter Wood, Second Rep.]; Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on 
Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/682 (Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Wood, 
Third Rep.]) or in the !LC Reports on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty 
interpretation (see, e.g., Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/660 (Mar. 19, 2013); Georg 
Nolte (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to 
the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/671 (Mar. 26, 2014); Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), 
Third Rep. on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/683 (Apr. 7, 2015)). 
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even if, on the one hand, one focuses, as this chapter does, on the identification and 
interpretation of international law, thereby leaving aside both its creation and its en-
forcement, and even if one addresses more particularly, on the other hand, the in-
terpretation of treaties and the identification of customary international law, thereby 
excluding the identification of other sources of international law such as interna-
tional organizations' law and the role of international adjudication therein. Two fur-
ther restrictions of the chapter's scope are needed therefore. First of all, the chapter 
discusses the relevance of community interests in the identification and interpretation 
of treaty and customary law norms generally, and hence across regimes of international 
law. Its main example, however, is international human rights law because of its in-
teresting characteristics in this context. Second, the chapter focuses on the identifica-
tion and interpretation by international institutions, mostly international and regional 
courts (and mostly the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR)). Some dimensions of the domestic practice of identification 
and interpretation of international law are considered, however, albeit only when rel-
evant and despite the noncomparative scope of the study. 
Within these boundaries, some further topics are excluded from the chapter's scope 
because they are addressed in other chapters of the volume. First of all, the chapter 
does not address the role of international organizations' law for the formulation and 
promotion of community interests.7 Some of those organizations' treaties and the in-
terpretation thereof are discussed, but qua ordinary treaties, and without reference to 
the specificities of their interpretation under international treaty law8 (e.g., Articles 
4-5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)9) or to that of their re-
spective organizations' secondary law pertaining to community interests. Nor, sec-
ondly, does the chapter include a detailed discussion of the contribution of domestic 
or international courts to the protection of community interests in the identification 
and interpretation of treaties and customary law.10 Some of their case law is discussed, 
but not in depth and, importantly, not by reference to the institutional aspects of the 
pivotal role of the domestic or international judiciary and of judicial reasoning for the 
identification and interpretation of community interests. 
The structure of the proposed argument is four-pronged. Section II explains 
what the "relevance" of community interests in the "identification" of interna-
tional law means in this chapter. Section III explains how community interests can 
7 See, e.g., Alan E. Boyle, Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of International 
Environmental Law Through International Institutions, 3 J. ENVTL. L. 229 (1991). 
8 See, e.g., Christopher Peters, Subsequent Practice and Established Practice of International 
Organizations: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 617 (2011). 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] . 
10 See, e.g., Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Judicial Insights into Fundamental Values and Interests of the 
International Community, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OP JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER so YEARS 
327 (A. Sam Muller et al. eds., 1996); Gleider I. Hernandez, A Reluctant Guardian: The International 
Court of Justice and the Concept of "International Community", 83 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 13 (2013); Bruno 
Sim ma, Human Rights Before the International Court of Justice: Community Interests Coming to Life?, in 
1 COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY: LIBER AMICORUM RUDIGER WOLFRUM 577 (Holger P. 
Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012); Yoshiyuki Lee-Iwamoto, The ICJ as a Guardian of Community Interests? 
Legal Limitations on the Use of Provisional Measures, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NEW AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 71 (Andrew Byrnes, Mika Hayashi & Christopher Michaelsen eds., 2013). 
Treaty Interpretation and Customary Law Identification 53 
be of relevance in the context of the identification and interpretation of interna-
tional law in general. Section IV broaches the issue of how community interests are 
channeled into the interpretation of treaties. Finally, Section V addresses the rele-
vance of community interests in the identification of customary international law 
and Section VI concludes. 
II. The Relevance of Community Interests in the 
Identification of International Law 
As I explained in the previous chapter, community interests are best understood as 
interests (i) that are common (ii) and/or belong to a community (iii). International 
legal norms actually protecting community interests are referred to as "community 
interest norms"11 or even "communitarian norms."12 Community interests can play 
different roles and be of variable relevance in the identification of international law. 
Before explaining what community interests' "relevance" amounts to, one first needs 
to establish what the "identification" of international law actually consists in. 
First of all, regarding the identification of international law, this chapter focuses on 
the identification of international law norms and their interpretation, with respect to 
treaties and custom. It excludes therefore, first of all, international lawmaking itself, and 
in particular the conclusion of treaties and the formation of custom, and, secondly, the 
enforcement of international law once it has been implemented and applied to a given 
case. Of course, identification and interpretation are best understood as an extension of 
lawmaking, albeit in the context of the implementation of international law, and are then 
also a condition for its enforcement. It is difficult therefore to keep them apart entirely. 
As a matter of fact, the identification and interpretation of international law norms, be 
they treaty-based or customary, are difficult to distinguish from one another to the ex-
tent that interpretation is often necessary to ascertain a given norm, and vice-versa. 
There are various reasons for this focus on legal identification and interpretation 
rather than lawmaking and enforcement. One of them is that, unlike the formation 
of a given abstract norm, its identification and interpretation in a concrete case may 
allow for other interests, including community interests, to be taken into account. 
To start with, this is because, as I will argue later in the chapter, other norms and 
duties binding the same subjects apply concurrently at that stage and have to be 
considered at the same time, including concurrent or even conflicting community 
interest norms in some cases. Another reason amounts to the different identity of the 
actors at stake: While treaties or customs arise from the convergence of many states' 
explicit consent or practice, their identification and interpretation belong either to 
individual domestic states in their decentralized implementation function, 13 on the 
one hand, or to international institutions, usually of a judicial nature, on the other. 
The fact that different actors besides states are involved in that process, and espe-
cially judicial institutions, contributes, as I will argue later in the chapter, to bringing 
11 See Isabel Feichtner, Community Interest, in 2 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). 
12 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 3, at 204. 13 See Tams, supra note 3, at 381. 
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distinct conceptions of community interests to the fore or, at least, new conceptions 
thereof that are informed by a new context. 
Secondly, regarding the relevance of community interests in the identification of 
international law, there are many ways to understand our object in this chapter. Its 
focus may be, first, on the identification and interpretation of international law norms 
that are community interest norms; second, on the identification and interpretation 
of international law norms by reference to community interest norms; or third, on 
the identification and interpretation of international law norms that are community 
interest norms by reference to other community interest norms. All three topics are 
equally interesting, but do not raise the same questions with respect to legal identifica-
tion and interpretation. They may actually even overlap in some cases. Furthermore, 
depending on the understanding of community interest norms that is used (i.e., com-
munity interests qua object, type, structure, source, and/or purpose of the interna-
tional legal norm, as I explained in the previous chapter), the relevance of community 
interests to the identification of custom and the interpretation of treaties may vary 
greatly. In turn, this may suggest that the question of the relevance of community 
interests in the identification of international law remains a largely indeterminate 
question. 
At any rate, the relevance of community interests in the identification of inter-
national law should not be conflated with two structural features of contemporary 
international law. 
The first is the hierarchy and the de-fragmentation of international law. Since com-
munity interests usually amount to fundamental interests, as I explained in the pre-
vious chapter, it is easy to see how one could regard community interests as generating 
normative hierarchies in international law. While it may be the case, there is no nec-
essary connection between the two. First of all, some community interests are not 
protected by peremptory norms, as confirmed by the now classical debates pertaining 
to the distinction between erga omnes duties and jus co gens norms, 14 or by the role 
of international ordre public played by certain (nonperemptory) international human 
rights norms.15 Second, some normative hierarchies under international law do not 
protect community interests, as illustrated by reference to Article 103 of the United 
Nations Charter. The same may be argued, by extension, about the potential role com-
munity interests may play in solving normative conflicts and especially for the alleged 
"de-fragmentation" of international law: Their role as rules of conflict is not granted 
and not all rules of conflict in international law actually protect community interests 
(e.g., the lex posterior or lex specialis rules). 16 Of course, this is not to say that com-
munity interests cannot help to prevent normative conflicts in international law, for 
14 See TAMS, supra note 3; Crawford, supra note 3, at 199-201, by reference to the conflation in Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 5) [here-
inafter Barcelona Traction case]. 
15 See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ~ 93 (1997). 
16 See also Jose E. Alvarez, Beware: Boundary Crossings, in BOUNDARIES OF STATE, BOUNDARIES OF 
RIGHTS-HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 43 (Tsvi Kahana & Anat 
Scolnicov eds., 2016). 
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instance through the systemic interpretation17 of certain treaty norms by reference 
to community interest norms like international human rights law, as we will see, but 
their role as conflict rules is not established. 
The second structural feature is the constitutionalization of international law. 
Mainly by reference to their importance, the relevance of community interests in in-
ternational law is sometimes considered to be a confirmation of the constitutional di-
mension of international law. The connection between the two derives from the alleged 
constitutional nature of some or all community values and interests (e.g., interna-
tional human rights18), but also from their alleged constitutive role in and/or of the in-
ternational community.19 Again, while there are clear links between the two features 
of international law, the constitutional discourse ascribes a political and public law 
dimension to community interest norms, and international law more generally, that 
they do not necessarily have (yet).20 
III. Community Interests and the Identification 
of International Law in General 
Before turning to the relevance of community interests in the identification of custom 
and the interpretation of treaties, it is important to discuss two cross-cutting issues 
pertaining to their relevance in the identification of international law in general. 
The first issue is the identity of the identifiers and interpreters of international law, 
whose characteristics should be emphasized with respect to the protection of commu-
nity interests. 
The first feature is that most of the identification and interpretation of international 
law occurs as self-identification and self-interpretation, and hence in a decentralized 
fashion, by states and their respective domestic authorities. This raises the question 
whether these are necessarily self-referential in terms of interests. However, as I argued 
in the previous chapter with respect to state consent, the answer to this question is 
negative. This is because states' interests also include domestic and global community 
interests, and because states, especially democratic ones, are collective entities whose 
institutional design can aim at including the protection of community interests, in-
cluding in their external policy. Depending on the international law regime, more-
over, some international institutions may actually also contribute additionally to the 
identification and interpretation of international law norms. Of course, one should 
17 See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention, 54 INT'L & Co MP. L.Q. 279, 285-86 (2005); Study Group on the Fragmentation oflnternational 
Law, Rep. on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law,~~ 411-12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi). 
18 See Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 EuR. J. INT'L L. 749 
(2008). 
19 See Gaja, supra note 2; Crawford, supra note 3, at 322-42. 
20 See Samantha Besson, Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism and Democracy, 
in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 381 
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). See also Alvarez, supra note 16. 
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not assume too readily that international institutions are necessarily more prone to 
consider community interests because they are international. As a matter of fact, the 
rules on the interpretation of treaties and the identification of custom apply equally 
to both domestic and international institutions. Further, as we will see, domestic 
determinations constrain both the systemic and evolutive interpretations developed 
by international institutions. This should not come as a surprise in view of the argu-
ment I made in the previous chapter relative to the democratizing role and deliberative 
function of state consent and practice in the determination of community interests. 
The second institutional specificity that may affect how community interests are 
taken into account in the identification and interpretation of international law is 
that most of it is judicial in nature, whether at the domestic or international level. Of 
course, depending on the area of international law where community interest norms 
are interpreted or identified, other political institutions, whether domestic or interna-
tional, may also be involved before or after that judicial stage, or even concurrently. 
The mutual irritation induced by the separation of powers domestically, but also be-
tween the domestic and the international levels, and by the coexistence of concurrent 
legislative, executive, and judicial interpretations of treaties/identification of custom, 
may actually contribute to enhancing their quality and the chances of taking com-
munity interests into account.21 Interestingly, however, (domestic and international) 
judicial identifications and interpretations of international law have a particular au-
thority, across regimes, mostly because of the specific nature and constraints of judi-
cial reasoning. As a matter of fact, one of the features of judicial reasoning that matters 
particularly for the protection of community interests is the role general principles of 
international law play therein. 
The second issue is the role of general principles in the identification and interpre-
tation of international law. Because many community interest norms happen to be 
general principles and because general principles often protect community interests, 
general principles are an important vehicle for taking community interests into 
account in the identification of international law. As a matter of fact, general princi-
ples are used both as a type of international legal norm and as a source of international 
law,22 thereby making the reference to community interests even easier in practice. 
Qua source of international law, general principles do not depend on state practice 
and can therefore be used to escape the cumbersome identification of customary in-
ternational law in some cases. 23 This is particularly clear in domestic and international 
judicial reasoning given how closely related principles are to judicial reasoning. As a 
matter of fact, the ICJ has regularly referred to general principles of international law 
21 See, for example, for the Swiss practice, Samantha Besson & Odile Ammann, La pratique suisse de 
determination du droit international coutumier, 21 CAHIERS FRIBOURGEOIS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 30-1 
and 40-1 (2016). http://www.unifr.ch/ius/euroinstitut_fr/forschung/publikationen/freiburger_schriften 
(study commissioned by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs at the request of ILC Special 
Rapporteur Wood). 
22 See, e.g., Samantha Besson, General Principles in International Law-Whose Principles?, in LES 
PRINCIPES EN DROIT EUROPEEN-PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN LAW 19 (Samantha Besson & Pascal 
Pichonnaz eds., 2011); Pierre d'Argent, Les principes generaux a la Cour internationale de Justice, in LES 
PRINCIPES EN DROIT EUROPEEN-PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN LAW, supra. at 107. 
23 See, e.g., d'Argent, supra note 22. 
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in its case law, including in order to protect community interests.24 Importantly for 
our purpose, these references to general principles are not done clearly as references 
to a source of international law, but do not comply with the usual reasoning for the 
identification of customary international norms either. As we will see in the context 
of customary law identification, this relaxed approach to the origin of general princi-
ples facilitates taking community interests into account in domestic and international 
judicial decisions. 
Among the various functions of general principles in practice, one should mention 
the promotion of coherence and systematicity in judicial reasoning, on the one hand, 
and the development of an axiological hierarchy between norms of international law 
stemming from different sources and regimes, on the other.25 The protection of com-
munity interests through general principles fits both roles really well, as I explained 
in the previous section. Of course, using general principles to achieve those aims also 
raises the issue of the constraints weighing on judicial discretion in international law. 
One may indeed question the creative reference to general principles in international 
adjudication, both from a democratic legitimacy perspective and that of parochialism 
and imperialism.26 As I explained in the previous chapter, an egalitarian and epi-
stemic corrective may be for international courts to grant democratic states a margin 
of appreciation and thereby to give (states)people a say in the identification and inter-
pretation of community interest norms. 
IV. Community Interests and Treaty Interpretation 
In order to present and assess the relevance of community interests in the interpreta-
tion of treaties, it is important to start by explaining how community interests relate to 
international treaty law in general, before moving to treaty interpretation itself. 
A. Community interests in international treaty law 
International treaty law is often described as being incompatible with the promo-
tion and protection of community interests. 27 This is allegedly because the structure 
of treaties themselves is contract-like, hence reciprocal and bilateral. In turn, this is 
said to make various features of treaty law, which reflect the contractual structure of 
treaties, difficult to reconcile with the specificities of multilateral treaties and espe-
cially those that contain multilateral rights and duties like community interest norms. 
24 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction case, supra note 14, ,- 34; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ,- 218 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua 
case]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ,- 57 (Apr. 20) [here-
inafter Pulp Mills]. See Hernandez, supra note 10; Yoshiyuki Lee-Iwamoto, supra note 10. 
25 See Besson, supra note 22. 
26 See Samantha Besson, Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication-Getting Over 
the Amour Impossible Between International Law and Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 413 (Karen Alter, Cesare Romano & Yuval Shany eds., 2014). 
27 See Klabbers, supra note 5, at 770. 
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In light of this, some authors have suggested different routes in order to accom-
modate community interests in international treaty law. One approach, endorsed 
by Paulus, recommends that we "bilateralize" the interpretation and enforcement of 
treaties protecting community interests.28 Not only does this sound counterproduc-
tive for community interests, but it is not necessary, as we will see. A second approach 
suggests using what Klabbers refers to as the "secret trapdoors" of treaty law, 29 such as, 
for instance, the humanitarian exception to Article 60(5) of the VCLT, the invalidity 
rule of Article 53 of the VCLT, or the "objective regime" exceptions to Articles 33-38 of 
the VCLT on pacta tertii. 30 Yet a third proposal consists in developing special regimes 
of treaty law for multilateral treaties protecting community interests. In this last re-
spect, it is worth noting, however, that the International Law Commission (ILC)'s 
2006 Report on Fragmentation could trace none. The report actually demonstrates 
that all multilateral treaties concluded under special regimes protecting community 
interests can be, and actually are, interpreted by reference to the VCLT.31 
As I explained in the previous chapter by reference to state consent, the recip-
rocal structure of treaties is not a necessary conceptual feature of treaties. This actu-
ally explains how legislative or multilateral treaties, like international human rights 
treaties, have arisen over time despite being submitted to the VCLT. It also explains 
various features of treaty law that are best regarded as mainstream, rather than as 
exceptions in an allegedly contract-oriented framework. One may mention treaty 
law rules on reservations, succession, or termination/suspension where multilateral 
treaties concluded in regimes as varied as international humanitarian law, interna-
tional human rights law, 32 international labor law, or international environmental law 
are treated as such and not corseted into bilateral treaty rules or principles.33 As a re-
sult, there is no clear incompatibility between international treaty law and multilateral 
treaties protecting community interests. 
B. Community interests in the interpretation of treaties 
A confirmation of the applicability of the general rules of international treaty law to 
community interest norms may be found in the rules and principles pertaining to 
treaty interpretation in international customary treaty law (captured as they are by 
28 See Andreas L. Paulus, Reciprocity Revisited, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST, 
supra note 2, 97. See also Elisa Morgera, Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-Judicial 
Enforcement of Global Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law, 23 EuR. J. INT'L L. 743 
(2012). 
29 See Klabbers, supra note 5, at 770. 
30 See David J. Bederman, Third Party Rights and Obligations in Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES 328, 341-45 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2014). 
31 See Study Group on the Fragmentation ofinternational Law, supra note 17, "" 172-74. 
32 See Samantha Besson, The Sources of International Human Rights Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
ON THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837 (Samantha Besson & Jean d'Aspremont eds., 2017); 
Matthew Craven, Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law, 
11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 489 (2000). 
33 See also Keith, supra note 5, at 761-65, 767. 
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Articles 31-32 of the VCLT34). Those rules and principles can indeed accommodate 
treaties that contain reciprocal as much as nonreciprocal duties. 35 As a matter of fact, 
the methods encountered in those provisions are very close to those used to interpret 
domestic legislation (in all its variety). They focus on the treaty's meaning in context 
with an emphasis on the system and the object and purpose of the treaty in each case. 36 
Of course, there are no rules under international treaty law that indicate expressly 
that the interpretation of treaties should be done in the light of community interests. 37 
Still, the issue may arise when community interest norms are to be interpreted or bear 
on the interpretation of other norms of international law because they apply to and 
bind states concurrently. It is important therefore to know how the interpretation of 
community interest norms, but also of other norms than community interest norms 
by reference to community interest norms, should be handled. 38 
Community interests may be taken into account in treaty interpretation through 
different channels, and more particularly through different "canons" or "methods" 
of interpretation. These may apply separately or in combination, depending on the 
case. Neither of them is superior to the others. 39 The first channel is systemic interpre-
tation of a community interest norm, or of a norm other than a community interest 
norm, by reference to other community interest norms according to Article 31(3)(c) 
of the VCLT; the second is evolutive interpretation of a community interest norm, 
or of a norm other than a community interest norm, according to Article 31(3)(b) of 
the VCLT; and the third is teleological interpretation of a community interest norm, 
or of a norm other than a community interest norm, by reference to community in-
terest norms according to Article 31(1) of the VCLT. The interpretation of interna-
tional human rights treaties constitutes our focal example in each case because of 
their interesting characteristics in all three respects.40 
1. Systemic interpretation 
The first channel for the interpretation of norms other than community interest 
norms, or of community interest norms themselves by reference to other community 
interest norms, may be systemic interpretation along the lines of Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT. The provision refers to "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties." 
34 See RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 13-20 (2d ed. 2015). See also Int'! Law Comm'n, 
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.813 (May 24, 2013). 
35 See also Klabbers, supra note 5, at 777-79. 
36 According to the International Law Commission, the "nature" of a treaty (e.g., a treaty including 
community interest norms) should not affect the default applicability of the general rules of interpreta-
tion under the VCLT, supra note 9. See, e.g., Int'! Law Comm'n, supra note 34; Int '! Law Comm'n, Rep. on 
the Work ofits Sixty-Fifth Sess.," 16, U.N. Doc. A/68/10 (2013). 
37 Gaja, supra note 2, at 63-64. 38 See also id. at 62-63. 
39 See Int'! Law Comm'n, Law of Treaties, [1966] 1(2) Y.B. Int'! Law Comm'n 219, 219-20. 
40 It is actually common among international human rights lawyers to approach international human 
rights law as a self-contained regime with special rules pertaining to sources and interpretation (see also 
Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 293," 111). Contra Besson, supra note 32. 
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In a nutshell, this reference to "other law" is usually interpreted to mean (i) any 
other norm of international law (rule or principle) (ii) binding the parties (iii) either 
(a) to the interpreted treaty when that treaty is multilateral and includes duties erga 
omnes partes or (b) to the dispute in other cases.41 This includes therefore general 
international law norms, such as customary international law or general principles, 
but also multilateral treaties binding the parties to the treaty.42 Systemic integration 
enables the interpreter to bring norms from other regimes and other sources into their 
search for meaning.43 This explains why systemic interpretation has been described by 
McLachlan as a "master-key" in the international legal system.44 
"Other law" under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT may include many potential com-
munity interest norms. Although systemic integration does not necessarily imply that 
community interests should be taken into account, the broader normative context 
includes them and they may therefore be relevant.45 Some may go one step further 
and argue that community interests should actually be taken into account in sys-
temic interpretation. They could rely on the two presumptions made in the 2006 ILC 
Fragmentation Report and, more generally, on its argument for coherence46 and "sys-
temic integration": "(a) the parties are taken to refer to customary international law 
and general principles for all questions which the treaty does not itself resolve in ex-
press terms; (b) in entering into treaty obligations, the parties do not intend to act 
inconsistently with generally recognized principles of international law."47 The first 
requirement may be derived from the arbitral sentence Georges Pinson,48 whereas the 
second could be drawn from the ICJ decision in the Case concerning Right of Passage 
over Indian Territory.49 Of course, systemic interpretation cannot necessarily resolve 
conflicts with community interest norms or guarantee that community interest norms 
are respected in priority thereafter. 
One finds confirmation of the use of systemic interpretation for the promotion of 
community interests in practice. True, there was no trace of such systemic interpreta-
tion in the ICJ's case law until the Oil Platforms case,50 but there have been a few cases 
since then. 51 
In international human rights law, it is the practice of the ECtHR that encompasses 
most examples of systemic interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. The 
41 See, e.g., Jean-Marc Sorel & Valerie Bore Eveno, Article 31: Convention of 1969, in 1 THE VIENNA 
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES-A COMMENTARY 804, 825-29 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein 
eds., 2011); Richard Gardiner, The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation, in THE OXFORD 
GurnE TO TREATIES, supra note 30, at 475, 485-87. See also Gaja, supra note 2, at 69. 
42 Int'! Law Comm'n, 871st Mtg., [1966) 1(2) Y.B. Int'! Law Comm'n 192, '52. 
43 See also Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 17; Fouad Zarbiev, 
Les regles d'interpretation de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traites: un outil d'harmonisation 
en droit international?, in L'HARMONISATION INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT (Christine Chappuis, Thomas 
Kadner Graziano & Benedict Foex eds., 2007). 
44 See McLachlan, supra note 17, at 281. 45 See Gaja, supra note 2, at 64. 
46 See Gaja, supra note 2, at 70. 
47 See Study Group on the Fragmentation oflnternational Law, supra note 17, '465. 
48 Pinson (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 327, '422 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
49 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6' 142 (Apr. 12). 
50 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, "41, 161 (Nov. 6). 
51 See Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 
Rep. 177," 112-13, 123 (June 4); Pulp Mills, supra note 24, '66. 
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Court refers to that provision to interpret its own regime's community interest norms, 
that is, rights of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), by reference 
to other community interest norms, whether these are other international human 
rights norms or other community interest norms. The practice started in 1975 and 
has become quite important in this respect. 52 The same may be said about discussions 
thereof in the separate opinions of judges in some of these cases. 53 As a matter of fact, 
the ECtHR goes further than what Article 31(3) of the VCLT provides. Thus, in Demir 
and Baykara,54 the Court referred to other law (the European Social Charter) that was 
not binding on all parties to the ECHR, and especially not on Turkey, a party in that 
dispute. To that extent, the Court may be said to interpret the ECHR as truly universal 
human rights law. 55 This may actually be justified by reference to another method of 
interpretation: Evolutive interpretation. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that 
the Court sometimes mentions both lit. b and c of Article 31(3) of the VCLT, 56 thereby 
straddling the two methods of interpretation. 
2. Evolutive interpretation 
The second channel for the interpretation of community interest norms, or of norms 
other than community interest norms, by reference to community interest norms may 
be evolutive interpretation along the lines of Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT. The provi-
sion refers to "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 
52 See, e.g., Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) " 34-35 (1975); Loizidou, supra note 
15," 43-44; Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, ' 55; Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 
2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157," 35, 157; McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, '36; Bankovic 
v. Belgium, 2001-Xll Eur. Ct. H.R. 333,' 57; Mamatkulov, supra note 40," 111, 123; Behrami v. France 
46 I.L.M. 746, ' 122 (Eur. Ct. H.R., May 2, 2007); Maumousseau v. France, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1204 ' 
60; Carlson v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. '68 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-89410; Demir 
v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, "60-68; Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. l,' 19; Rantsev 
v. Cyprus, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, " 273-74; Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
61, ' 126; Cudak v. Lithuania, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 121, ' 56; Neulinger v. Switzerland, 2010-V Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 117, ' 131; Raban v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. ' 28 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-
101471; Sabeh El Lei! v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. ' 48 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-105378; 
Sneersone v. Italy, Eur Ct. H.R. ' 85 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-105624; Hirsi Jamaa 
v. Italy, 2012-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. l," 170-71; M.R. v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R.' 137 (2012), http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng?i=OOl-111198; Wallishauser v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. ' 59 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=OOl-112194; Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 115, ' 169; Oleynikov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ' 56 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-117124; X. v. Latvia, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, ' 
92; Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. ' 112 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-138948; 
National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. United Kingdom, 2014-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. l, ' 
76; Margus v. Croatia, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. l,' 129; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2014-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, '23; 
Hassan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. " 100-103 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-146501. 
53 See, e.g., the opinions in National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, supra note 52; the 
opinions in Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 52. 
54 Demir and Baykara, supra note 52, " 85-86. See also National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers, supra note 52," 76, 98. 
55 See also Samantha Besson, Human Rights as Transnational Constitutional Law, in HANDBOOK ON 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 234 (Anthony Lang & Antje Wiener eds., 2017). 
56 See, e.g., Hassan, supra note 52, ' 102. 
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In a nutshell, what this covers is (i) a subsequent practice (ii) among all parties to 
the treaties (iii) that is sufficiently substantiated to establish their respective consent.57 
This is particularly important for evolutive concepts used in certain treaties; com-
munity interest norms are actually often couched in treaties using evolutive concepts 
(e.g., "human rights" or "sustainable development"). 
Importantly, the evolution of concepts embedded in a treaty does not neces-
sarily imply that protection of community interests is strengthened by evolutive 
interpretations. However, the possibility of taking into account recent developments 
is likely to provide an opportunity to read into a treaty a meaning that could enhance 
their protection. 58 One finds confirmation of the use of evolutive interpretation for the 
promotion of community interests in practice. There are traces thereof in some of the 
ICJ's case law. 59 
In international human rights law, it is the practice of the ECtHR that encompasses 
most examples of evolutive interpretation.60 There are fewer examples of evolutive 
interpretation than of systemic interpretation in the Court's case law, however. As 
I mentioned before, in any case, certain cases are decided under both lit. b and c of 
Article 31(3) of the VCLT61 or without mentioning Article 31 of the VCLT at all,62 
thereby making such quantitative assessments moot. Some authors argue that the 
ECtHR's notion of"dynamic" interpretation and its approach to the ECHR as a "living 
instrument''63 go beyond what is allowed under evolutive interpretation in the VCLT.64 
This is an exaggeration, however. A confirmation may be found in the "European 
consensus" requirement developed by the Court. Before endorsing a new evolutive 
interpretation of the Convention, the Court first establishes the existence of a sub-
sequent transnational practice supporting such an interpretation. In the absence of 
the latter, states are granted a broad margin of appreciation.65 This condition in the 
reasoning comes close to requiring some sort of consolidated transnational human 
57 See, e.g., Gardiner, supra note 41, at 498. See also Georg Nolte, Introduction, in TREATIES AND 
SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 1 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013). 
58 See Gaja, supra note 2, at 66. 
59 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ' 112 (Sept. 
25) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros]; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 639, ' 68 (Nov. 30); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights 
(Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 213, '64 (July 13); Application of the Interim Accord 
of 13 September 1995 (Maced. v. Greece), Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 644, ' 99 (Dec. S); Request for 
Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J. Rep. 281, ' 75 (Nov. 11); Whaling in 
the Antarctic (Aust!. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226,' 83 (Mar. 31). 
60 See Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ' 100 (1991); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A)" 67, 73 (1995); Hassan, supra note 52," 100-103; National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers, supra note 52, ' 76. 
61 See, e.g., Hassan, supra note 52,' 102. 
62 See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, '61; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) ' 103 (1989). 
63 See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)' 31 (1978). 
64 See, e.g., Basak Cali, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights, in THE OXFORD 
GumE TO TREATIES, supra note 30, at 525, 538-41; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Interpretation of Human Rights 
Treaties, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 739, 740 (Dinah Shelton 
ed., 2013). 
65 See, e.g., Lautsi, supra note 62, '61. 
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rights practice and, arguably, even a human rights custom.66 The ascertainment of the 
"European consensus" may therefore be equated with the establishment of the agree-
ment between parties required by Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT. 
3. Teleological interpretation 
The third channel for the interpretation of community interest norms, or of norms 
other than community interest norms by reference to community interest norms, may 
be teleological interpretation along the lines of Article 31(1) of the VCLT. The provi-
sion refers to the treaty's "object and purpose." In a nutshell, what this two-pronged 
notion refers to is the idea that meaning should capture purpose (usually of the whole 
treaty).67 Of course, purpose itself may be in need of interpretation. This explains why 
teleological interpretation is deemed controversial by some authors.68 
Importantly, reference to the purpose of a treaty does not necessarily imply that 
protection of community interests will be strengthened. However, taking a commu-
nity interest norm's purpose, that is, the protection of given community interests, into 
account is likely to provide an opportunity to read into a treaty a meaning that would 
enhance the protection of community interests.69 One finds confirmation of the use 
of teleological interpretation for the promotion of community interests in practice. 
There are traces thereof in some of the ICJ's case law,70 even if it has been controver-
sial at times.71 In international human rights law, it is the practice of the ECtHR that 
encompasses most examples of teleological interpretation under Article 31(1) of the 
VCLT and is used to interpret ECHR rights.72 
What is most common, however, is for international courts to combine systemic 
and/or evolutive interpretations with teleological interpretation by including a ref-
erence to the purpose of the treaty.73 This has been the case in ICJ judges' separate 
opinions, in particular.74 Interestingly, the ECtHR also combines evolutive interpre-
tation with teleological interpretation to the extent that it interprets ECHR rights dy-
namically by reference to their purpose (a kind of "teleo-evolutive" interpretation). 
66 See, e.g., Ineta Ziemele, Customary International Law in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, in THE JUDGE AND INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM (Conseil de !'Europe 2012); Samantha 
Besson, Human Rights Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication-Putting Domestic Courts as 
International Law Adjudicators in Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10 ESIL PROC. 43 (Mary Footer 
& August Reinisch eds., 2016). 
67 See, e.g., Sorel & Bore Eveno, supra note 41, at 832. 
68 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties, 8 FINNISH Y.B. 
INT'L L. 138 (1997); Zarbiev, supra note 5, at 207. 
69 See Gaja, supra note 2, at 70. See also Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, supra 
note 17, '21. 
70 See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 23 (May 28); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 59,' 112. 
7 1 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
supra note 70, at 49 (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez). 
72 See Al-Saadoon, supra note 52,' 127. 
73 See Zarbiev, supra note 5, at 223; Sorel & Bore Eveno, supra note 41, at 833-34. 
74 See, e.g., Oil Platforms, supra note SO, separate opinion of Judge Sim ma, ' 6; Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, '200 (July 8) (separate opinion of 
Judge Weeramantry). 
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This confirms the idea that teleological interpretation is a hybrid of systemic and evo-
lutive interpretation.75 
V. Community Interests and the Identification of Customary 
International Law 
To present and assess how community interests are involved in the identification of 
customary international law, this section discusses how they fit secondary rules on the 
formation of customary international law, before turning to the latter's identification 
itself. This structure echoes the one used in the previous section to discuss the appli-
cability of international treaty law to community interest norms, first with respect to 
general treatymaking rules and then in the context of treaty-interpretation.76 
A. Community interests in the secondary rules on customary 
international law 
Customary international law arises from the combination of two elements: A gen-
eral, regular, and coherent practice of states (consuetudo) and their conviction that 
that practice is binding as law (opinio juris). Even though the ascertainment of the 
two elements is more and more conflated in practice (through double-counting or 
privileging opinio juris over practice, precisely to promote community interests in 
case of insufficient state practice),77 they are still considered as distinct steps in the 
formation of custom in practice78 and rightly so because custom amounts, conceptu-
ally and structurally, to a normative practice.79 
Customary international law is often described as the primary source for the pro-
motion and protection of community interests. This is because, as I explained in the 
previous chapter, it is general in its personal scope and corresponds to that extent 
to the collective nature of the holders and/or bearers of many community interest 
norms. 80 As a matter of fact, its general scope is also what explains its being the most 
suitable source of international human rights law since the personal scope of human 
rights and their corresponding duties is universal. 81 However, as I also argued, the 
general or multilateral nature of customary international law qua source does not nec-
essarily imply the multilateral nature of the rights and duties it contains. As a matter 
of fact, it may contain many juxtaposed bilateral norms and duties depending on their 
75 See Int'! Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Sess., Text of the Guide to the Practice 
on Reservations to Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add.l, at 352-53 (2011) (para. 3 to the commentary to 
guideline 3.1.5). 
76 On the relationship between (customary law) "identification" and (treaty) "interpretation," see 
Besson & Ammann, supra note 21, at 93-98. 
77 Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (Dec. 18); Nicaragua case, supra note 24. 
7B See Int'! Law Comm'n, Identification of Customary International Law-Text of the Draft Conclusions 
Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.872 at 2 (May 30, 2016) (Draft 
Conclusion 3(2)). 
79 See Besson, supra note 32. Bo See Gaja, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
BJ See, f~r a full argument, Besson, supra note 32. Contra Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of 
Human Rights Law: Custom, ]us Cogens and General Principles, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992). 
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subject matter. And, conversely, many treaties include multilateral duties and com-
munity interest norms. 
Curiously, some authors have argued that the practice element in the formation of 
customary international law favors reciprocity and bilateral practices and prevents 
it, as a result, from being an adequate international law source for the protection of 
community interests. 82 This argument should be rejected, however. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, indeed, the requirement of state consent in international law-
making, including customary lawmaking, should be dissociated from the reciprocity 
or mutuality of the duties generated thereby. Some custom-constitutive practices are 
unilateral or bilateral, while remaining general, while others are multilateral and can 
account for the formation of customary community interest norms, as a result. 
B. Community interests in the identification of customary 
international law 
There are no secondary rules of international customary law that indicate that the 
identification of custom should be done in the light of community interests. 
However, the issue may arise when customary community interest norms are to be 
identified or bear on the identification of other norms of customary international law 
because they apply to and bind states concurrently. It is important therefore to know 
how the identification of customary community interest norms or of other customary 
law norms than community interest norms by reference to community interest norms 
should be handled. Some of the materials considered significant for the identification 
of customary international law by the ILC's Draft Conclusions on the Identification of 
Customary International Law83 may actually contribute to the inclusion of commu-
nity interests, even though some issues remain with the basic approach used in the 
identification process and its ability to accommodate community interests. 
1. Significant materials for the identification of customary international law 
Among the various features of the customary law identification process and the 
materials used in that process that may enhance the consideration of community 
interests, one should mention the following three. 
First is the role of general principles. The ambiguous relationship between general 
principles of international law (qua norm and qua source) and customary interna-
tional law, discussed in the previous section, indirectly confirms the important role 
certain customary law principles may have for the protection of community interests. 84 
A lot of customary law is of a principled nature, indeed. This applies particularly in in-
ternational human rights law. In practice, moreover, some of those principles tend to 
be identified without going through the two-element identification process applicable 
to customary law, and hence independently from their source. This is what happened 
in the ICJ's Pulp Mills case,85 for instance, but also in others where the Court did 
B2 See Paulus, supra note 28, at 94. 
B• See also Gaja, supra note 2, at 42. 
B3 See Int'! Law Comm'n, supra note 78. 
B5 Pulp Mills, supra note 24, '" 204. 
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not state clearly whether it regarded a principle as a general principle under Article 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute or as a customary principle.86 
Second is the reference to treaties. When ascertaining the existence of a practice or 
opinio juris, it is common for domestic or international institutions to refer to treaties 
on these issues. This is because treaties may codify existing customs or contribute to 
their crystallization or even to their formation (ILC's Draft Conclusion 1187). This is 
particularly the case regarding multilateral treaties, including treaties protecting or 
referring to community interest norms, like international human rights treaties88 or in-
ternational environmental law treaties. Thus, if domestic or international institutions 
can bring in customary international law to bear on the systemic or evolutive interpre-
tation of treaties in the light of community interest norms, as I explained before, the 
reverse can happen too. What remains open, however, is whether further inspiration 
may be drawn from systemic or evolutive interpretation in treaty law for systemic or 
evolutive identification of customary law. The coherence or integrity argument cer-
tainly applies equally well to customary international law. Moreover, there is no addi-
tional consent-based objection to be raised here that could not be raised and put to rest 
in treaty law. This is, on the one hand, because of the compatibility in principle between 
state consent and the protection of community interests, as I explained in the previous 
chapter, and, on the other, because (democratic) state consent is inherently limited by 
reference to the grounding democratic value of equality and the corresponding com-
munity interest norms like nondiscrimination rights or jus cogens norms. 
Third is the reference to international institutional evidence. One of the interesting 
features of the identification of customary international law is how much evidentiary 
credit the identifying (domestic or international) institutions should give to (other) in-
ternational institutions' confirmations of state practice and opinio juris. This is partic-
ularly the case regarding the weight that is usually given to past international judicial 
decisions (ILC's Draft Conclusion 13), especially by the ICJ or the ECtHR, but also to 
international organizations' law in general (ILC's Draft Conclusion 12), both types of 
international institutions being recognized platforms for the development of commu-
nity interest norms. Another kind of evidentiary material encountered, and which may 
contribute to bringing some community interests to bear on identification, are nongov-
ernmental organizations' (NGOs') compilations of state practice, professional interna-
tional law associations' recommendations, or the ILC's own reports, conclusions, and 
articles. This matters particularly in international customary human rights law where 
the practice of international human rights institutions, especially monitoring bodies 
and courts, when it relies on states' contextual and evolutive specifications of inter-
national human rights law (see the discussion of Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT above), 
could be used as evidence of (inter-)state practice and contribute to the identification of 
customary human rights law. There is a certain circularity loop at play here between the 
86 See also d 'Argent, supra note 23. 
87 Int'! Law Comm'n, supra note 78. See also Wood, Third Rep., supra note 6, ,-,- 31-44, esp.,- 41. 
88 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction case, supra note 14, ,-,- 33-34; Questions Relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, ,- 99 (July 20). 
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customary and conventional nature of international human rights law, but it is virtuous 
and corresponds to the transnational nature of human rights. 89 
2. Issues with the basic approach to the identification of customary 
international law 
There are two notable difficulties in the basic approach to the identification of cus-
tomary international law that may hamper the consideration of community interests 
in practice. 
First is the self-referential invocation of domestic practice and opinio juris. As was 
the case in the context of treaty interpretation, due to the decentralized structure of 
international law implementation, states and their domestic authorities are the main 
actors identifying customary international law. As I argued, however, this should not 
per se be considered an obstacle to the protection of community interests. On the con-
trary, it may lead to the diversification of perspectives and conceptions thereof in new 
circumstances, and thereby enhance the consideration of community interests. 
Nevertheless, the feature of that decentralized domestic practice of identifica-
tion of customary international law that may stand in the way of taking community 
interests into account is the domestic authorities' tendency, when identifying an in-
ternational customary law norm, to refer (primarily or exclusively) to their own prac-
tice and opinio juris, and not to other states' with an eye to generality. By contrast, this 
issue does not arise in the international identification of customary international law. 
Indeed, international institutions have to make sure, based on a comparative survey, 
that the practice and opinio juris assessed are sufficiently general.90 There are many 
explanations for this self-referential tendency: Some relate to institutional laziness and 
limited comparative resources, while others pertain to the duality of domestic/inter-
national functions of governmental authorities and the difficulty for them to keep the 
identification of custom separate from their contribution to its formation, and even, 
arguably, their inability to differentiate between the identification of custom and com-
pliance with a domestic institutional precedent rule in the identification of custom.91 
Again, however, it is not clear that customary self-reference is necessarily self-
interested and plays against the consideration of community interests. After all, as 
I explained in the previous chapter, states also have (domestic and global) collective 
interests and their prior practice they are actually referring to in the identification of 
customary law may already be oriented toward the protection of community interests. 
89 See Besson, supra note 32. 
9° For a critique of the ICJ's deductive or even assertive instead of inductive "method," however, see, e.g., 
Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ's Methodology Between Induction, 
Deduction and Assertion, 26 EuR. J. INT'L L. 417 (2015). For a discussion, see Omri Sender & Michael 
Wood, The International Court of Justice and Customary International Law: A Reply to Stefan Talman, 
EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-international-court-of-justice-and-customary-
international-law-a-reply-to-stefan-talmon/. 
91 For a discussion of the Swiss practice in this respect, see Besson & Ammann, supra note 21, at 37, 
78, 126-29 with numerous references. See, generally, Simonetta Stirling-Zanda, The Determination of 
Customary International Law in European Courts (France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland), 4 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT'L L. 3, 9 (2004). 
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As a matter of fact, self-reference may be used intentionally by a state to set a multi-
lateral or general trend in the international formation of customary international law 
itself. This can actually be the case for customary community interest norms, as in in-
ternational human rights law or international humanitarian law.92 
Second is the role of specially affected states. Another feature of the practice of iden-
tification of customary international law that may be of concern is the weight given 
to states whose interests are specially affected in the process of ascertainment of the 
representative nature of the relevant practice (ILC's Draft Conclusion 8(1)).93 This re-
quirement could clearly prevent the reference to community interests or, at least, to 
those interests' conceptions embedded in the practice of states that are not specially 
affected. 
The extent to which this could influence the respect of community interests re-
mains open, however. After all, community interests are presumably of equal con-
cern to all states and hence affect them all equally and not specially.94 Moreover, even 
if some states are considered to be specially affected by issues pertaining to commu-
nity interests (e.g., an archipelagic state threatened by the rise of sea level due to global 
warming), the requirement that their practice be taken into account specially need 
not threaten the protection of community interests and may simply be epistemolog-
ically superior as a result of practice-provided, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
states' conceptions of community interests are not approached as necessarily self-
interested. Of course, and to go back to the previous point, the more specially affected 
a state is, the more likely it is to refer to its own domestic practice and opinio juris 
when identifying customary international law.95 Interestingly, the latest version of the 
ILC's Draft Conclusions on the identification of customary international law no longer 
refers to the requirement of special affectedness among those conditioning the repre-
sentative nature of the practice (ILC's Draft Conclusion 8(1)). 
VI. Conclusions 
The relevance of community interests in treaty interpretation and customary identifi-
cation of community interest norms, or of other international law norms by reference 
to community interest norms, is as indeterminate and difficult to assess as the notion 
of community interests itself. 
The gist of this chapter's argument has been that the rules pertaining to the inter-
pretation of treaties and the identification of custom provide many routes for states, 
their domestic authorities and international institutions to include and protect com-
munity interests. Unlike the formation of a given abstract norm, its identification and 
92 See, for example, the Swiss practice, in Besson & Ammann, supra note 21, at 132-35, 169. 
93 See North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./Den., Fed. Rep. of Ger./ Neth.). Judgment, 1969 
l.C.J. Rep 3, '"74 (Feb. 20). See also Wood, Second Rep., supra note 6, '" 54. 
94 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 74, at 414 (separate opinion of 
Judge Shahabuddeen). See also id. at 535-36 (Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry). But see Sienho 
Yee, Report on the ILC Project of Customary International Law. 14 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 375, §§ 47-53 
(2015). 
95 See, e.g., the Swiss practice, in Besson & Ammann, supra note 21. 
Treaty Interpretation and Customary Law Identification 
interpretation in a concrete case may actually allow for other interests, including com-
munity interests, and/or distinct or more recent conceptions thereof, to be taken into 
account. This is because of the other norms and duties applying concurrently in these 
cases and potentially conflicting with them, but also of the (many) other domestic and 
international institutions involved in that process, especially judicial ones. 
Moreover, certain secondary rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties and the 
identification of customary law may even include duties to refer to community interest 
norms or, at least, secure the conditions for such a consideration to take place. True, 
more transparency and discipline are required in the implementation of those treaty 
interpretation and customary identification rules to pursue community interests ef-
fectively. This is the case, for instance, as illustrated in the international human rights 
practice, regarding the conditions for systemic and evolutive treaty-interpretation or 
the generality of the practice requirement in the otherwise self-referential identifica-
tion of customary law. 
Importantly, however, none of those rules has to be bent to get there. Concerns 
about the necessary bilateral features of treaties and custom, but also, accordingly, 
of the rules for their identification and interpretation, are largely misguided, indeed. 
Treaties and custom do not necessarily give rise to duties that are reciprocal in struc-
ture. As to the alleged self-interested features of state consent in international law-
making, they are exaggerated; they underestimate the collective nature, but also the 
potential contribution of the institutional design of states, especially democratic states, 
for the protection of domestic and international community interests. In the absence 
of a central international lawmaker able to determine our community interests in a 
democratic way, we should not too quickly disparage the only dimension of interna-
tional lawmaking we have that gives (states)people an equal albeit separate voice in de-
termining their community interests, that is, their democratic state's consent. 
